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In this paper, we analyze the strength and nature of bequest motives in the United States using data from 
the 2000 Health and Retirement Study (HRS).  The results of our analysis suggest that bequest motives are 
very strong in the United States and that they are altruistically motivated.  This suggests that the altruism (or 
dynasty) model applies in the United States and that the selfish life cycle model does not apply.  Moreover, our 
results also suggest that older, wealthier, married, more highly educated, Caucasian, healthy, and non-religious 




Different theoretical models of household behavior have different implications for bequest motives.  For 
example, the selfish life-cycle model assumes that individuals care only about themselves, and thus it implies 
that individuals will either not leave any bequests at all, leave only unintended bequests arising from lifespan 
uncertainty, or leave only selfish bequests (bequests that are a quid pro quo for care and financial support 
during old age).  By contrast, the altruism or dynasty model assumes that individuals harbor intergenerational 
altruism toward their children, and thus it implies that individuals will leave altruistic bequests (bequests that 
do not involve any quid pro quo).  Thus, by analyzing the strength and nature of bequest motives, we can shed 
light on which model of household behavior applies in the real world.  In this paper, we conduct such an 
analysis for the United States using data from the 2000 Health and Retirement Study (HRS). 
The HRS asks respondents about the probability that they will leave a bequest to their children and about 





children.  We can assess the strength of the bequest motive by looking at how likely individuals are to be 
planning to leave a bequest, and we can assess the nature of the bequest motive by looking at the impact of 
financial help and transfers to and from children on the likelihood of leaving a bequest.  If we find that 
respondents who have received or expect to receive financial support from their children are more likely to 
leave a bequest to their children, we can surmise (though we cannot definitively say) that one is a quid pro quo 
for the other, that bequests are selfishly motivated, and that the selfish life cycle model holds.  Otherwise, we 
can conclude that bequests are altruistically motivated and that the altruism or dynasty model holds.  
The results of our analysis suggest that bequest motives are very strong in the United States and that they 
are altruistically motivated.  This suggests that the altruism (or dynasty) model applies in the United States and 
that the selfish life cycle model does not apply.  Moreover, our results also suggest that older, wealthier, 
married, more highly educated, Caucasian, healthy, and non-religious individuals are more likely to leave a 
bequest than other individuals.   
 
2. The Strength of the Bequest Motive 
 
As can be seen from Tables 1 and 2, the average probability of leaving a bequest of 100,000 dollars or 
more is 52.4% (1~100 scale), and 30.4% of the sample plan to leave a bequest of 100,000 dollars or more with 
100% probability.  Only 27.3% reported that they plan to leave a bequest of 100,000 dollars with a probability 
of zero.  (Refer to Table 2 for the results for those under 65 and those 65 or older, which are broadly similar to 
the results for all ages.)  Thus, bequest motives appear to be quite strong in the United States. 
Moreover, other intra-family intergenerational transfers (especially transfers from parents to children) are 
also relatively common in the United States.  For example, as can be seen from Table 2, the average 
probability of giving financial help totaling 5,000 dollars or more to their children during the next ten years is 
35.7% (1~100 scale), while the average probability of receiving financial help totaling 5,000 dollars or more 
from their children during the next ten years is 9.1% (1~100 scale).  With respect to financial help given or 
received in the past, 22.4% of respondents have already given transfers to their children, while 2.6% of 





transfers given to children averaged 5,869 dollars, while transfers received from children averaged 3,056 
dollars (not shown in Table 2).  (Refer to Table 3 for the results for those under 65 and those 65 or older, 
which are broadly similar to those for all ages.) 
 
3.  The Nature of the Bequest Motive 
 
In this section, we analyze the determinants of the probability of leaving a bequest of 100,000 dollars or 
more.   The results for the full sample are shown in Table 4, and the results for those aged less than 65 and 
those aged 65 or older are shown in Table 5. As can be seen from these tables, age, net wealth, marital status, 
educational attainment, race, self-reported health, and religion have a statistically significant impact on the 
probability of leaving a bequest of 100,000 dollars or more.  In particular, we find that older, wealthier, 
married, more highly educated, Caucasian, healthy, and non-religious individuals are more likely to leave a 
bequest than other individuals.   
In terms of the variables of most interest to us, those who expect to give major financial help to their 
children and those who have already made transfers to their children are more likely to leave a large bequest 
although the latter result is statistically significant only at the 10% level and is significant only in the full 
sample.  These results suggest that individuals who are altruistic are more likely to have already made transfers 
to their children and are also more likely to be planning to give financial help as well as bequests to their 
children in the future, which in turn suggests that Americans are altruistic. 
By contrast, those who expect to receive major financial help from their children are less likely to leave a 
large bequest.  If individuals are selfishly motivated, they should be more likely to leave a large bequest if their 
children provide them with major financial help because one is a quid pro quo for the other, and the fact that 
the direction of impact is the opposite suggests that individuals are altruistic: parents are actually more willing 
to leave a large bequest to their children if their children are too poor (or unwilling for some other reason) to 
give them major financial help, and children are actually more willing to give major financial help to their 





The only result that is consistent with the selfish life cycle model is the result that those who have already 
received major transfers from their children are more likely to leave a bequest.  This is consistent with the 
selfish life cycle model because it suggests that one is a quid pro quo for the other.  However, this result is also 
consistent with the altruism model if both parents and children are altruistic.  Moreover, this result is 
statistically significant only at the 10% level and is significant only in the full sample and in the sample of 
those aged less than 65. 
Thus, all of the results are consistent with the altruism model, at least if we assume that both parents and 
children are altruistic.  Only one result is consistent with the selfish life cycle model, but that result is not a 
very strong result, is not significant in all of the samples, and is also consistent with the altruism or dynasty 
model if we assume that both parents and children are altruistic. 
 
4. Summary  and  Conclusions 
 
This paper has analyzed the strength and nature of bequest motives in the United States using data from 
the 2000 Health and Retirement Study, and our results suggest that bequest motives are very strong in the 
United States and that they are altruistically motivated.  This suggests that the altruism or dynasty model 
applies in the United States and that the selfish life cycle model does not apply.  This is in sharp contrast to 
Japan, where the selfish life cycle model is found to apply (see, for example, Hayashi (1995), Horioka et al. 
(1998, 2000, 2001)).  Our results also suggest that older, wealthier, married, more highly educated, Caucasian, 
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Probability of Leaving $100,000











Age 65+  
 
 

















1~99  5,749 (42.3%)  2,599 (37.7%)  3,150 (46.9%) 
100  4,131 (30.4%)  2,207 (32.0%)  1,924 (28.6%) 
      
a In the 2000 HRS (Health and Retirement Study) data, respondents were asked “Including property and other 
valuables that you might own, what are the chances that you (and your husband/wife/partner) will leave an 
inheritance totaling $100,000 or more?”   
b13,604 of the total respondents answered this question. The total number 




































Table 2  
Variable Measurement










Dependent Variables      
Expects to leave $100,000
    Self-reported probability of leaving 
$100,000 or more on a scale 0 ~100% 
 52.4  (50.0) 
Independent Variables      
Household Type: 
   Age 65 or older 





Net Worth  Total household assets minus 
household debt in 2000. 
 $113,956 
(15,000) 
Children  # of children    3.2 (3.0) 
Financial Transfers: 
   Expect to give help 
    
 
   Expect to receive help 
 
 
   Have transferred $ to child 
 
   Have transferred $ from child 
 
Expectation of giving financial help 
totaling $5,000 or more to children 
over the next 10 years  (0 ~ 100) 
Expectation of receiving financial help 
totaling $5,000 or more from children 
over the next 10 years (0 ~ 100) 
1 if $ amount transferred to child  
greater than zero, 0 otherwise 
1 if $ amount transferred from child 

















   Married 
   Separated/Divorced 
   Widowed 
   (Never married/others)
 b 
 
1 if married, 0 otherwise 
1 if separated/divorced, 0 otherwise 
1 if widowed, 0 otherwise 








   Less than high school 
   High school 
   Some college 
   (College grad & more)  
 
1 if less than high school, 0 otherwise 
1 if high school graduates, 0 otherwise
1 if some college educa., 0 otherwise 








   White 
   Black 
   (Others) 
 
1 if white, 0 otherwise 
1 if black, 0 otherwise 








  Excellent 
  Very good 
(Fair/Poor) 
 
1 if excellent, 0 otherwise 
1 if very good, 0 otherwise 







   Strong 
   Moderate 
   (No religion) 
    
 
1 if very strong, 0 otherwise. 
1 if moderate, 0 otherwise. 






a  This table presents variables included in the multivariate analyses. 





Table 3  
Financial Transfers and Economic Status: A Comparison of Age 65 + and Age Under 65 Groups 
 
Variables Age  65+ 
(n=10,713) 
Age Under 65 
(n=8,867) 
 
Expectation of Financial 





  Give financial help to child   31.2 (10.0)  40.5 (30.0) 
  Receive financial help from child   7.0 (0.0)  11.5 (0.0) 
    
Transferred Amount:  Mean (Median)  Mean (Median) 
  Transfer to child $ amount   $6,089 (2,000)  $5,604 (2,000) 
Transfer from child $ amount  
 
$2,995 (1,000)  $3,130 (1,000) 
Presence of  Financial Transfers:      
 Have transferred $ to child  14.8%  31.6% 
 Have transferred $ from child  1.7%  3.7% 
      
    
Economic Status:  Mean (Median)  Mean (Median) 
 Household  total income  $41,035 (2,300)  $45,259 (23,000) 
 Net worth  $100,149 (14,600)  $121,342 ($15,000) 































Table 4  
OLS Regression Results of All Respondents (N= 19,580):  




Leaving $100,000 or more 
(0-100% probability) 
 Coefficients    SE 
Household Type:      
  Age 65 and older  4.271
*** .934 
  (under age 65)     
  Net Worth  1.13E-6
*** 4.83E-7 
  # of children  0.105  0.193 
    
Financial Transfers:     
  Expect to give help to child  0.317
*** 0.012 
  Expect to receive help from child   -0.109
*** 0.019 
  Transfer $ to child  1.635
+ 0.897 




   (Married) 
   Separated/Divorced 
   Widowed 

















   Less than high school 
   High school 
   Some college 
   (College & post college) 













   Black 
   Other race 










  Excellent 
  Very good 










   Strong 
   Moderate 
   (No religion) 





























OLS Regression Results: A Comparison of Age 65+ and Age under 65 Respondents:  






Age Under 65 
(n=8,867) 
 Coefficients SE  Coefficients    SE 
           
  Net Worth  2.63E-6  1.73E-6  9.84E-7
* 4.99E-7 
  # of children  0.692
* 0.358  -0.129  0.229 
Financial Transfers:         
  Expect to give help to child  0.313
*** 0.021  0.317
*** 0.014 
  Expect to receive help from child   -0.150
*** 0.039  -0.095
*** 0.023 
  Transfer $ to child  2.283  1.604  1.427  1.085 




   (Married) 
   Separated/Divorced 
   Widowed 

































   Less than high school 
   High school 
   Some college 
   (College & post college) 
























   Black 
   Other race 

















  Excellent 
  Very good 


















   Strong 
   Moderate 
   (No religion) 


































+p<.10, *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001  
 